Introduction
In many ways the presidency is the center of the American political process. The *Theodore Arrington, an associate professor at the University of North Carolina-Charlotte, publishes in the general area of parties and voting behavior. He is currently president of the faculty at UNCC. **Saul Brenner is an associate professor at the University of North Carolina-Charlotte. He is the author or coauthor of 20 articles, most of which concern Supreme Court decisionmaking.
four-year term of office of the president makes a kind of cyclical calendar of political events. The legislative process often begins with presidential proposals and ends with presidential approval or veto of the bills passed by Congress. The media coverage of the office is massive; greater by several times than the attention paid to the Supreme Court, the Congress, or the bureaucracy. The president is clearly dominant in making foreign policy and rivals the Congress for power in domestic matters. In this debate we will examine the process by which the American president is elected. If the presidency is central to our political system, the method of filling the office must surely be a central concern of those who wish to understand American politics. The presidential selection process is extremely complex; involving a multitude of primary elections, seemingly chaotic conventions; nationwide voting, and the Electoral College. It is this last element in the process we have chosen to debate. The provisions of the original Constitution (written in 1787), the Twelfth Amendment, and the extra-constitutional Theodore S. Arrington (left) and Saul Brenner Forum development of the two-party system combined to produce the election system usually referred to as the Electoral College. This arrangement provides that the president is chosen by presidential electors. Each state is entitled to as many electors as it has U.S. Senators (two) and U.S. Representatives (at least one each). The electors from each state go to their own state capital to cast their votes for president and vice-president. If no candidate obtains a majority of these electoral votes, the House of Representatives decides who is to be president from among the three people who received the most electoral votes, with each state delegation in the House entitled to one vote. The Senate selects the vicepresident in such cases.
In November of 1980, a Gallup Poll found that 67 percent of the American people favored the direct election of the president, 19 percent opposed, and 14 percent were undecided.
Although the Constitution permits each state to determine for itself the method by which presidential electors are to be chosen, all states (except Maine) have used the winner-take-all at-large election method for over 100 years. Under this procedure each political party designates a slate of electors to run in each state and the slate that receives the most popular votes constitutes the electors from that state. The electors that are chosen on the winning slate are supposed to vote automatically for the nominee of their party. Indeed, this tradition is so strong that in most states the names of the party nominees for president and vice-president appear on the ballot instead of the names of the electors on the slate. In the postWorld War 11 period, however, six electors failed to vote for their parties' nominee and in 1960 
Affirmative
In this affirmative argument I will show that: (1) the Electoral College is undemocratic because it can, and has, thwarted the expressed will of the people; (2) the system is undesirable because it encourages regionally based third parties to seek undemocratic election results and thus influences the presidential candidates to attend to regional instead of national concerns; and (3) it is undemocratic because the electoral vote system results in some votes counting more than others. I will also show that only a direct popular vote system can correct these defects.
The Wrong Choice. Why does the Electoral College sometimes select as president a person who comes in second or third in the popular vote? The answer is found in the winner-take-all provisions of the system. A candidate who gets the most votes in a particular state will obtain all of the electoral votes of that state. Yet that candidate will not have received all of the popular votes in that state. Indeed, he or she may have received less than half of them. Because of this mechanism, there is never a one-to-one relationship between popular and electoral votes. Indeed, the votes can be distributed in such a way that one candidate wins a majority of electoral votes by slim margins while the other wins a minority of electoral votes by wide margins.
At first this unfortunate result seems unlikely. After all, it has failed to occur since 1888. In fact, we simply have been lucky. In any close election the chance of the popular winner being the election loser is great. The last two times it happened occurred within twelve years of each other, during a period when the par- On the other hand, how does the Electoral College system handle multiplecandidate contests? In a multiple party race, as in the two-candidate contest, the person who receives the most votes in a sufficient number of states to attain an electoral vote majority will win. This may or may not be the person who obtained the most popular votes (the plurality winner) and it may or may not be the person who could win a runoff election. The Electoral College fails to deal well with the situation of high factionalism.
As the election of 1860 shows, the Electoral College may select as president a candidate who is supported by less than 40 percent of the people, while on other occasions it fails to award the office to those with plurality support far above 40 percent (as in 1824, 1872, and 1888). In short, it is a crazy system in which victory is related to popular support only on most occasions.
For those of us who believe in the democratic ethos, the above argument is sufficient to demonstrate the foolishness of the Electoral College. But there is more. The election of the popularly rejected candidate these days would undermine the president's legitimacy and possibly produce a constitutional crisis. In the period since our last popularly rejected president (Benjamin Harrison in 1888) the American people have come to accept democratic values which include the belief that the president ought to be the candidate that most people prefer. This is apparent in the Gallup Poll results reported in the Introduction. And the Gallup organization has also been asking Americans to explain the Electoral College in polls since 1951. They have found that only about one-third of the people can even correctly identify the Electoral College. Will these people, who accept popular election as right and do not realize that the Constitution fails to provide for it, recognize the legitimacy of a president who lost the popular vote?
Would the losers in the Electoral College recognize the legitimacy of a president, when their own candidate received a greater number of the popular votes? I maintain that a large proportion would not. A person has the legitimate claim to the presidency when virtually all of the people believe that he or she has the right to be president. When some substantial proportion of the people reject such a claim, the president would find it exceedingly difficult to carry out the duties of the office. Foreign leaders, bureaucrats, interest groups, and Congress would ignore presidential wishes. The government would be leaderless. I contend that the loss of the popular vote to another candidate would create sufficient doubt about the president's legitimacy to produce this kind of a crisis. When Gerald Ford was president, some observers claimed that his apparent failure to lead the country was, in part, the result of his lack of an election mandate from the people. Yet his claim to the office was firmly grounded in the Constitution. Think what would happen if the president were the candidate who was actually defeated in the popular vote election, but won the office through the mathematical peculiarities of the Electoral College. Do we have to wait until the Electoral College again selects a popularly rejected candidate before we act to replace this irrational system with the only alternative that makes sense? Regional Third Parties. Minor parties are a valuable part of the American twoparty system. As long as there are free, competitive elections, there will always be some people who are dissatisfied with both major parties. These people should be free to form their own political organizations and contest the presidency. In American history, such third parties have been important outlets for new political ideas. Some of these new concepts have been adopted by one or both of the major parties. However, third party activity is undesirable if its aim is to "spoil" the chances of some other candidate winning a majority of the votes. It is particularly unwanted if it is pursued to blackmail the major party candidates into making concessions to regional or local interests. The Electoral College encourages such unfortunate third party activity, but direct popular election would not do so. To understand why this is true we must look at the majority vote requirement of the current system.
In one sense the Electoral College arrangement is a plurality system. In each state the candidate who receives the most popular votes is awarded all of the electoral votes of that state. This aspect of the system discourages third parties in general or, to be more precise, broadly based, national third parties (such as the John Anderson Party). This is obvious from American political history. Since the Civil War, only one election has been fought between more than two broadly based strong candidates. This was the election of 191 2, when Theodore Roosevelt ran for the presidency on the Progressive Party ticket. In other words the winner-take-all plurality vote features of the Electoral College permits third parties to form and have their say, but does not allow them to prevent the people from making their choice between the two major parties.
People become valuable to a candidate depending on where they live. It is a mistake, however, to think that the same groups are always favored by this arrangement.
The Electoral College, on the other hand, provides that if no one receives a majority of the electoral votes, the election is thrown into the House of Representatives. Thus regional or specific statebased third parties, by commanding enough popular votes in one or more states to receive a plurality there, can capture electoral votes. It is possible for such regional groups to capture electoral votes by winning only a very small fraction of the total national popular vote. By Forum withholding electoral votes from the major party candidates they may be able to prevent anybody from getting a majority in the Electoral College. This can be useful in three ways. First, the regional third party could instruct its electors to vote for one of the two major party candidates in exchange for specific promises on future presidential actions. This strategy is explicitly what is planned when a party runs a slate of unpledged electors. But even if the electors are listed on the ballot as favoring a specific candidate, they are legally free to bargain, with or without that candidate's approval. Second, if the Electoral College bargaining fails, the regional Congressmen in the House of Representatives could make a deal during the complicated one-vote-for-each-state runoff procedures that must be followed in the House in such cases. Lastly, regional third parties might find contesting the presidency useful even if it fails to prevent one of the major parties from obtaining a majority of the electoral votes. The fear that a similar effort might be successful in future elections can influence the major parties to make deals with regional interests. Some claim that certain minority groups are advantaged by the Electoral College, but this is clearly incorrect. Some claim that certain minority groups are advantaged by the Electoral College, but this is clearly incorrect. In order for some minority group to be advantaged by the system the group must first be so concentrated in the most populous states that it can sway the vote of those states by having the members of the group vote as a bloc. And second, the group must be so small in national terms that such bloc voting would not be equally effective in a direct popular election. One is hard pressed to find a group that meets these criteria. Take Conclusion. I have shown that the Electoral College is undemocratic because it sometimes fails to elect the popular choice as president, violates the oneperson, one-vote principle, and encourages regionally based third parties to seek undemocratic outcomes and thus causes presidential candidates to be more attentive to regional interests than to national concerns.
The direct popular vote alternative, as proposed in S.J. Res. 1, solves all of these problems. Since the president would be directly elected by the voters, the popular choice would always prevail. And all votes would be equally counted, no matter where the voter lived. The potential constitutional crisis of legitimacy would cease to worry us. Regional third parties would be no more encouraged than nationally based ones. They could not prevent the popular choice from being elected, nor could they bargain or blackmail the major party candidates into special concessions.
In some ways reform of the Electoral College is like a leaky roof. The roof doesn't leak until it rains, but then it is hard to fix the leak. When the sun is out the leak would be easy to repair, but it isn't leaking. So, too, we don't need to get rid of the Electoral College as long as it continues-by luck-to select the candidate who is also favored by most voters. When the water floods into our house, it will be too late to fix the roof. Let's not wait until this reform is "needed" before we act.
Negative
In defense of the Electoral College and in opposition to the direct election scheme I will show that (1) the direct election plan will result in the election of candidates preferred by a minority of the voters; (2) it is highly unlikely that a regional third party candidate will be able to do mischief under the Electoral College; and (3) the direct election proposal will create an uneven balance between the larger and the smaller states.
Direct Elections: The Danger of an Unrepresentative Result. What standards ought to be used in a democratic society for selecting a president? Clearly, in a two-candidate race the person who receives the most votes ought to be chosen. My opponent is so concerned that a presidential candidate with fewer votes than his or her adversary might be elected under the Electoral College that he is willing to scrap the Electoral College to make sure that this result cannot happen. Yet, since 1888, in the course of 22 two-person races (defined as elections in which the two leading candidates garnered at least 80 percent of the vote) the presidential candidate who obtained the most votes always won the election. My opponent attempts to explain this result in two different ways. First, he asserts that the popular will can be thwarted only in "closely competitive" elections and many of the elections in the post-1888 era were held during periods when one party was dominant. Seven of these elections, however, were "closely competitive" (defined as elections in which the winning candidate's margin of popular victory was 5 percent or less). Nevertheless, the man who received the most votes always won. Indeed, in 1960 John Kennedy's popular margin was only .2 percent and in 1968 Richard Nixon's was only .7 percent. Second, my adversary claims that the conformity of the elections under the Electoral College to democratic principles is a matter of luck. A professional gambler would reply to this argument by saying, "When you win 22 times in a row, or even 7 times in succession, you are likely to have more than luck in your favor."
The above discussion pertains to one way democratic principles can be violated. A far greater threat to these principles can occur when there are more than two major candidates seeking the presidency. In that situation a much higher percentage of the voters can be denied their choice. It can be expected that the direct election scheme, with its 40-percent runoff provision, will generate elections of this kind. Candidates from such parties will seek electoral votes in regions in which they are strong and hope that neither of the two major party candidates will obtain a majority of the electoral vote. If both these goals are achieved, the election will be subject to some kind of bargaining. This sounds terrible, and if there were a real chance that these events could happen I, too, would favor changing the Electoral College system to eliminate the threat. I, of course, would still oppose the direct election scheme. Rather, I would urge that the electoral votes be cast automatically, with the candidate receiving the most electoral votes declared the winner. But the Constitution should not be amended to guard against remote possibilities.
Why is the scenario pictured by my opponent so remote? The answer is that it requires three conditions to be met, all of which are unlikely. The first condition is that a regional third-party candidate must obtain electoral votes. More specifically, any group in the population whose voting percentage in the populous states exceeds its percentage in the country as a whole is favored by the Electoral College. In the 1980s people who lived in urban areas, Catholics, Jews, and Hispanics had this characteristic, while in the 1 960s blacks and possibly low-income people were in this category as well. At first glance the advantage received by these groups appears to be unfair and seems to suggest that the direct election plan, which treats all votes the same, ought to be adopted. But prior to changing one element of the federal system we ought to consider the workings of the other parts of that system. When we examine the distribution of the seats both in the Senate and in the House of Representatives it is clear that the less populous states are favored in these two bodies and, thus, the very same groups that are benefited by the Electoral College are disadvantaged in Congress. In the Senate it is obvious that the small states are advantaged, for there are two Senators from each state regardless of population. 
